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Justice in Her Own Right: 
Bertha Wilson and the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
Jamie Cameron* 
I. AN INSTITUTION LENGTHENED BY THE SHADOW OF ONE WOMAN 
Upon being sworn in at the Supreme Court of Canada, Bertha 
Wilson declared herself “a true servant of the law” and expressed her 
trust that “within the collegial structure of this national Court I can be a 
faithful steward of the best of our legal heritage”.1 Her appointment 
marked the confluence of two landmark events: the near simultaneous 
arrival of the Supreme Court of Canada’s first woman judge and 
Canada’s newly enacted constitutional rights.2 Her tenure on the Court, 
from 1982 to 1990, was a momentous — and a poignant — time in 
Bertha Wilson’s life. In extra-judicial speeches she processed her doubts, 
fears, and anxieties about the “awesome responsibility” of decision-
making, admitting that, for her, each judgment would “always be a 
lonely decision”.3 Nor did the collegial bonds she yearned for develop at 
the Court.4 Inveterate loner that she was, Wilson turned — as she had at 
other times in her life — to her own resources. One wonders whether she 
found comfort, or courage, in the determined words of Edward Everett 
                                                                                                             
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1 “Response of Madame Justice Wilson”, Swearing-in at the Supreme Court of Canada 
(March 30, 1982), in Speeches Delivered by the Honourable Bertha Wilson [hereinafter “Wilson 
Speeches”] [unpublished volume, available at the Supreme Court of Canada Library] 15, at 18. 
2 Bertha Wilson was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada in March 1982 and sworn 
in on March 30, 1982; the Constitution Act, 1982 and Charter of Rights and Freedoms were enacted 
on April 17, 1982; see Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
3 “One Woman’s Way to the Supreme Court”, Remarks Made at the Women Lawyers’ 
Dinner, 22nd Australian Legal Convention (July 1983), Wilson Speeches, supra, note 1, at 132. 
4 Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001), at 152 [hereinafter “Judging Bertha Wilson”] (stating that “Wilson was 
prepared to pay her dues from the beginning”, but “although she had anticipated that it would be 
difficult establishing herself in the previously all-male enclave of the Supreme Court, in some ways 
it turned out to be harder than she had expected”). 
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Hale, who famously pronounced: “I am only one man but I am one man. 
I can’t do everything but I can do something. And what I can do”, he 
continued, “I ought to do. And what I ought to do, by the grace of God I 
will do.” It would be difficult to find a quotation that more aptly 
described her decision-making years at the Court.5 
At her retirement ceremony, Justice Wilson admitted to being “an 
unabashed and enthusiastic supporter of the Charter”.6 Her extra-judicial 
speeches show that she was in the Charter’s thrall, as intrigued as she 
was intimidated by its myriad challenges and promises.7 It mattered 
immensely to Justice Wilson that the Court create a solid foundation for 
the Charter’s guarantees in its earliest and most critical decisions.8 She 
pondered the problem of judicial activism, and wondered whether the 
Court could fulfil its mandate without overreaching its powers.9 Wilson’s 
speeches also reminded listeners how difficult it was for the Court to 
find its bearings when each case sent the judges headlong into 
unfamiliar, untested ground, knowing full well that whatever was 
decided would form part of the Charter’s bedrock.10 She predicted that it 
would not be easy for the Court to administer justice to individuals and 
at the same time create a framework of principle to guide the Charter’s 
interpretation.  
                                                                                                             
5 She used this quote from Edward Everett Hale twice in her speeches: see “Respecting the 
Law and our Democratic Institutions”, The Fifth R.W.B. Jackson Lecture (April 15, 1985), Wilson 
Speeches, supra, note 1, 356, at 373; and “Remarks Made at the University of Alberta Convocation 
upon Acceptance of an Honorary Degree (May 31, 1975), id., 374, at 381. 
6 Retirement Ceremony of the Honourable Bertha Wilson, Supreme Court of Canada 
(December 4, 1990), Wilson Speeches, id., 690, at 715. 
7 “Remarks Made at the University of Western Ontario Convocation upon Acceptance of 
an Honorary Degree” (June 8, 1984), Wilson Speeches, id., 184, at 196 (stating that “[a] tremendous 
responsibility has been placed upon the legal profession and the judiciary” and adding that “[i]t [i.e., 
the Charter] will take all our energy, all our skill, all our sensitivity and all our courage to meet the 
expectations of those who have laid this burden on us”). 
8 Id., at 195 (declaring that “[t]hese early cases … are of crucial importance” and that “we 
must, for starters, lay a base of jurisprudence under the individual rights and freedoms”). 
9 See, e.g., “Guaranteed Freedoms in a Free and Democratic Society — A New Role for 
the Courts?”, Address to the 22nd Australian Legal Convention (July 1983), Wilson Speeches, id., 
100, at 113 (stating that “there is no ideal balance between political considerations which may 
weigh heavily in favour of judicial restraint and moral considerations that may impel judges into a 
more active law-making role” but that the Charter “will bring into sharp relief the predisposition of 
judges to one approach or the other”). 
10 See, e.g., “Remarks Made at the Superior Court Judges’ Seminar” (August 1987), Wilson 
Speeches, id., 500, at 506 (stating that “[w]e are somewhat in the position of space travellers leaving 
the gravitational comfort of earth; we have to learn new ways to cope with unfamiliar and uncharted 
horizons”). 
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At times the strain of decision-making showed. In 1987, after five 
years of experience with the Charter, Justice Wilson spoke candidly of 
the “blow to one’s self-confidence” that the Charter had dealt, and 
invited the audience to agree with her that the experience to that point 
had been “somewhat demoralizing”.11 After noting that the road “may be 
a little rocky to start” and stating that “there is now, a period of panic”, 
she predicted that — as had happened with equity — “ultimately the 
bumps will get straightened out and an integrity [will] develop around 
the whole”.12 In 1988, not long after the Court’s momentous decision in 
R. v. Morgentaler, she informed her listeners that “your Supreme Court 
is fully aware of its awesome responsibility”, then added that “[n]one of 
us wanted this role” and “[n]one of us particularly enjoys it.”13  
Only later would it come to light that Justice Wilson experienced 
moments of bleakness at the Court. Through her biographer she 
explained how it felt to be excluded from informal processes of decision-
making that took place in cliques that had developed at the Court.14 She 
complained about ego and competition between judges,15 as well as 
“lobbying” by unnamed colleagues who, she thought, shamelessly 
sought support for their opinions.16 In frustration she lodged a formal 
complaint with the Chief Justice when other judges were unwilling or 
unable to respond to her draft opinions or to complete their own work.17 
                                                                                                             
11 Id., at 503-504. 
12 Id. 
13 “After Luncheon Remarks to the Essex County Law Association” (April 13, 1988), 
Wilson Speeches, id., 542, at 547. In the same speech she said that “[t]he judiciary realizes that its 
role has changed — and changed in a rather frightening way — a way which will undoubtedly 
expose us to public criticism from which traditionally we have been sheltered”. Id. See R. v. 
Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.). 
14 Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 4, at 164. 
15 Id. (stating that “[m]uch more ego came into play in the post-Charter era of constitutional 
cases when, Wilson noted, a strong element of competition emerged, with judges jostling to write 
majority opinions and make legal history”). 
16 “But in Wilson’s opinion, the main problem [for collegiality] was a certain divisiveness 
arising out of an escalating tendency during her later years on the Court for judges to lobby for 
support for their own reasons, something which she herself found repugnant.” Id., at 162. Anderson 
wrote that Wilson was steadfastly opposed to lobbying because the Court became “increasingly 
politicized”. By lobbying their colleagues or being lobbied by them, judges “were serving an agenda 
to which they had made an ideological commitment rather than meeting their individual 
responsibility to decide”. Id., at 164-65. 
17 Robert Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2003) [hereinafter “A Judge’s Journey”], at 372 (disclosing that Wilson sent Dickson 
a “stinging memorandum” in February 1985, fuming that she had “no fewer than 6 judgments that 
still awaited the attention of her colleagues” and providing excerpts from her communication which 
showed the extent of her exasperation). 
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If these experiences represented a breakdown in collegiality, the 
decision-making process was more serious because it marked a troubling 
departure, in her view, from standards of principled decision-making. In 
the face of dynamics that left her feeling isolated and marginalized, she 
was indefatigable just the same. 
In service terms Bertha Wilson remained the faithful steward 
throughout. She addressed decision-making with trepidation and a 
healthy sense of humility,18 and though some would accuse her of 
arrogance, she never wavered from her firm belief that the judicial office 
she held was the highest form of public service.19 Bertha Wilson stood 
out from her colleagues, but not only because she was the first and only 
woman judge at the highest Court at the time, or because she emerged as 
an uncompromising advocate of the Charter. She was unlike her co-
judges in another, critical way: she would not sign an opinion that did 
not reflect her view of the law, whether she agreed with the result or not. 
To do so would violate her conception of judicial duty and she would not 
— and perhaps could not — agree for collegial reasons when to do so 
would compromise principle.20  
Justice Wilson’s style of decision-making was distinctive and to 
some extent inflexible. She was especially fastidious about her views in 
Charter cases where the Court’s work was exploratory, but foundational. 
For those or other reasons, she did not write the majority opinion in 
many Charter cases and in fact authored a larger number of dissents; 
perhaps more intriguing than Wilson’s willingness to dissent was her 
penchant for concurring reasons.21 Even when she agreed with the 
majority’s disposition of the case, she often found fault with the reasons 
and wrote separately, on her own. By standing up for rights — and often 
standing alone in doing so — she gained a reputation as an advocate of 
                                                                                                             
18 “The office is always greater than the individual and it is the function and the office 
which lay claim upon our respect”: “Respecting the Law and Our Democratic Institutions”, The 
Fifth R.W.B. Jackson Lecture (April 15, 1985), Wilson Speeches, supra, note 1, at 371. 
19 “One Woman’s Way to the Supreme Court”, Remarks Made at the Women Lawyers’ 
Dinner, 22nd Australian Legal Convention (July 1983), Wilson Speeches, supra, note 1, 130, at 132 
(describing being a judge as “a hard and demanding life” which can be characterized “as being not 
so much the peak of a career but rather the ultimate form of public service”).  
20 According to Anderson, Wilson believed that “[i]n harmonizing their individual voices 
into majority judgments when possible or in preparing dissents and diverging concurrences when 
their analysis dictates that it has to be so, judges ought never to lose sight of their individual duty to 
decide”; Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 4, at 166. 
21 See Marie-Claire Belleau, Rebecca Johnson & Christine Vinters, “Voicing an Opinion: 
Authorship, Collaboration and the Judgments of Justice Bertha Wilson” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 53 
(providing statistical information about Wilson’s voting patterns). 
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rights, a feminist judge, a judicial activist and a great rebel.22 By the time 
she retired, Bertha Wilson’s iconoclasm was iconic. 
In many ways her legacy has been sensationalized, with the 
unfortunate result that “[p]ositions have been taken” and “myths have 
been made.”23 Too often the discussion is fraught with hyperbole which 
tends either to lionize or to demonize her work as a judge. Some have 
enlarged and magnified her, assigning heroic and transformative 
qualities to her which place Justice Wilson beyond criticism.24 Yet she 
has also been portrayed as a destructive force in Canadian democracy, as 
a prototype of the evil incarnate in American-style judicial activism.25 
Whether in the form of pure adulation or unremitting condemnation, 
these myths diminish Justice Wilson’s legacy by trapping her 
contributions in ideological compartments. If she placed her authority 
behind feminist positions at critical junctures in her judicial,26 extra-
judicial27 and post-judicial life,28 it is a different question whether she 
can, should or must be characterized as a feminist or a feminist judge. 
Data also show that she was the most activist in the complement of 
judges at the Supreme Court who first undertook to interpret the Charter, 
and the one who most fiercely defended its rights and freedoms.29 Here, 
as well, her work was not monolithic.  
                                                                                                             
22 See, e.g., Peter Calamai, “Bertha Wilson: Odd judge out in Supreme Court” The Ottawa 
Citizen, November 30, 1985, at B7 (describing Wilson as “the closest thing to a rebel that this 
current Supreme Court can boast” and describing the “rebel judge” as blunt). Justice Wilson wrote a 
Letter to the Editor, which was published on December 5, 1985, protesting the distortion of her 
remarks and stating, specifically, that “I am not a ‘rebel’ judge nor do I aspire to be one.” 
23 The quote is from Hermione Lee, Virginia Woolf (Great Britain: Vintage, 1997), at 3 
[hereinafter “Woolf”]. 
24 See Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 4. 
25 See, e.g., Robert E. Hawkins & Robert Martin, “Democracy, Judging and Bertha 
Wilson” (1995) 41 McGill L.J. 1, at 19 and 58 (stating that “Justice Wilson’s view of the courts’ 
role under the Charter sounds the death knell for the doctrine of separation of powers” and stating, 
in conclusion, that “[t]he subjective nature of her decisions … did real damage to the democratic 
choices of our elected representatives”).  
26 See R. v. Morgentaler, supra, note 13 (upholding a constitutional right to seek an 
abortion) and R. v. Lavallee, [1990] S.C.J. No. 36, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (S.C.C.) (incorporating the 
“battered wife syndrome” into the law of self-defence).  
27 See “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 507 
(her most famous speech and one which at the time was seen as a feminist judge’s manifesto). 
28 Report of the Canadian Bar Association on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession: 
Touchstones for Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability (Ottawa: Canadian Bar 
Association, 1993) [hereinafter “Touchstones Report”]. 
29 F. Morton, Peter Russell & Michael Withey, “The Supreme Court’s First One Hundred 
Charter of Rights Decisions: A Statistical Analysis” (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1. 
376 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
As one of the Court’s more literate judges, Justice Wilson turned 
easily to quotations and references in her speeches. She once juxtaposed 
Hale’s “one man” quotation with Ralph Waldo Emerson’s thought that 
“an institution is lengthened by the shadow of one person.”30 Though the 
“full, immense extent of her life’s work” may only reveal itself 
gradually, this article takes a modest and initial step toward a more 
analytical understanding of her jurisprudence.31 In particular, it considers 
how the Supreme Court’s early Charter jurisprudence was lengthened by 
the shadow of one woman: that of Bertha Wilson, the Court’s and the 
Charter’s first woman judge. It begins, in the next section, by showing 
how her concurrence in R. v. Morgentaler altered the course of section 
7.32 The second part of the article draws on counterexamples to discuss 
Wilson’s legacy as a feminist judge and a Charter activist. The third part 
briefly examines her most important contribution to the Charter: the 
contextual approach.33 The conclusion poses the three questions Bertha 
Wilson liked asking others — what is the chief end we serve? what new 
vision have we to offer our sons and daughters? what will we write at the 
top of our ledgers? — and then suggests how they might be answered in 
her case.34  
II. WILL CONCURRING OPINIONS REALLY MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 
At least under the Charter, Bertha Wilson was a decision-making 
outsider; with only a few majority opinions in significant cases she was 
left to write, predominantly, from the minority position.35 Though she 
would voice objections to the way decisions were reached, she had 
principled reasons for setting her own views out in separate reasons, 
                                                                                                             
30 “Remarks Made at the University of Alberta Convocation upon Acceptance of an 
Honorary Degree” (May 31, 1985) quoting “Essay on Self-Reliance”, Wilson Speeches, supra, note 
1, 374, at 381 (her emphasis; Wilson also changed “one man” to “one person”).  
31 Woolf, supra, note 23, at 4. 
32 Supra, note 13. 
33 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 
1326 (S.C.C.) (concurring opinion). 
34 See, e.g., “Remarks Made at the University of Calgary Convocation upon Acceptance of 
an Honorary Degree” (November 18, 1983), Wilson Speeches, supra, note 1, 150, at 154 (her 
emphasis). 
35 Her majority opinions include Reference re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act 
(Ont.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 44, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 (S.C.C.); R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] S.C.J. No. 
71, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541 (S.C.C.); R. v. Gamble, [1988] S.C.J. No. 87, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595 (S.C.C.); 
R. v. Turpin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296; and R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen, [1990] S.C.J. 
No. 91, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906 (S.C.C.). 
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whether concurring or dissenting.36 Justice Wilson believed that judges 
have a duty to decide each case as individually and independently as 
possible, and that diverse reasons enrich the Court’s work. 37 Even so, 
she must have wondered whether the Herculean effort she invested in 
concurring opinions would really make a difference.38 
To this day her concurrence in R. v. Morgentaler remains singular.39 
After granting section 7 a substantive interpretation in the Motor Vehicle 
Reference,40 the Court went on in Morgentaler to invalidate the Criminal 
Code’s41 scheme for therapeutic abortions. Plurality opinions by Dickson 
C.J.C. and Beetz J. found the scheme procedurally unfair without 
addressing the constitutional status of abortion, and indicated that 
Parliament could pass legislation curing the defects and re-introducing 
limits on abortion. That decision on narrow enough grounds, without 
more, sent shock waves across the country. Writing alone, Wilson J. 
pressed the boundaries of review to the outer edge. She cited the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s toxic abortion decision in Roe v. Wade with approval,42 
and then found that section 7 of the Charter protects a woman’s right to 
seek an abortion. In doing so she proposed an all-encompassing 
definition of liberty which would protect “individual decision-making in 
                                                                                                             
36 In addition to the concerns discussed above, she found it objectionable that colleagues 
signed on to reasons that were in circulation, before waiting to hear from others who had indicated 
their intention to write separately in concurrence or dissent. She thought that the judges should wait 
for all reasons to circulate, and then make a principled choice between the alternatives: Judging 
Bertha Wilson, supra, note 4, at 162-63. See also Jim Phillips, Letters to the Editor, The Lawyers 
Weekly, April 19, 2002 (responding to the report of an interview with retired Chief Justice Lamer, 
(Cristin Schmitz, “Former Chief Justice Lamer reflects on his brightest, darkest moments as 
Canada’s top jurist”, The Lawyers Weekly, March 29, 2002), confirming that at least in Edmonton 
Journal, supra, note 33, by the time her decision had been prepared there was no one left 
uncommitted among her colleagues to join her opinion). 
37 Justice Wilson believed that “diverging concurrences were also valuable because they 
created alternative pathways for the future development of the common law”: Anderson, Judging 
Bertha Wilson, id., at 154. 
38 See “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?”, supra, note 27. 
39 Supra, note 13. 
40 Reference re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 
S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle Reference” or “MVR”]. Section 7 of the Charter 
states that “[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with principles of fundamental justice.” 
41 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
42 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing a woman’s right to seek an abortion under the U.S. 
Constitution). Section 7 is the rough functional equivalent of the due process clause in the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees the right not to be denied life, 
liberty or property without due process of law. 
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matters of fundamental personal importance” from interference by the 
state.43 
For a variety of reasons, section 7 places the legitimacy of review 
especially at risk. The guarantee’s two clauses raise difficult questions 
about the scope of entitlement and the relationship between different parts 
of the Charter’s text, as well as about the role of the judiciary and limits on 
judicial review. Rather than shy from the challenge, Bertha Wilson 
described the guarantee — in aspirational and even inviting terms — as 
“the crucible in which the destiny of the Charter and the courts as its 
constitutional interpreters will be forged”.44 She positioned herself to play 
a leading role in the guarantee’s interpretation by writing key opinions in 
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)45 and 
Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada.46 That was before Antonio Lamer 
proposed a novel theory which purported to give section 7 a substantive 
interpretation and also avoid the legitimacy question. His opinion in the 
Motor Vehicle Reference set the stage for a contest between alternative 
interpretations of the guarantee — his and Bertha Wilson’s. 
The MVR epitomized the high hopes many had for the Charter as an 
agent of change, as well as the worst fears others harboured about its 
demoralizing and negative consequences for democratic governance. 
There, Lamer J. (as he then was) announced that, despite what the 
drafters intended, the Court had decided to grant section 7 a substantive 
interpretation. He dismissed the evidence that the guarantee was aimed 
at procedural matters and explained that the relationship between section 
7 and sections 8 to 14 made it imperative for the guarantee to be given 
substantive content.47 He maintained, in addition, that his interpretation 
of section 7 was sound because it placed institutional constraints on the 
                                                                                                             
43 R. v. Morgentaler, supra, note 13, at 171.  
44 “Constitutional Law — Section 7: Lecture to Second and Third Year Students, College 
of Law, University of Saskatchewan” (March 1987), in Speeches Delivered by the Honourable 
Bertha Wilson [unpublished volume, available at the Supreme Court of Canada Library] 448, at 449. 
45 [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.). Justice Wilson’s plurality opinion 
invalidating provisions of the Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52 under s. 7 of the Charter 
had the same impact that a majority opinion would have had in the circumstances. 
46 [1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.). Justice Wilson’s concurrence in this 
case provided an exegesis on various points of interpretation as well as a detailed analysis of the 
“political questions” doctrine. 
47 Justice Lamer characterized the guarantees set out in ss. 8 to 14 as specific illustrations 
of the kinds of deprivations s. 7 addresses in its general prohibition on interferences with liberty or 
security of the person that violate principles of fundamental justice. For that reason, he said that it 
would be “incongruous” to interpret s. 7 more narrowly — and in procedural terms — than the 
rights set out in ss. 8 to 14. Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 40, at 502. 
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scope of review.48 Justice Lamer declared that lingering doubts about the 
legitimacy of review had been put to rest, not only by the Charter’s text 
and history but also by his interpretation of section 7. Because 
substantive review would be limited to matters arising in the 
administration of justice, the courts would remain focused on questions 
of justice and not stray into the policy domain of the legislature.49  
The Court took an enormous step in granting this provision a 
substantive interpretation. Some were dismayed by the Court’s failure to 
exercise greater caution and others welcomed its decision to give the 
guarantee an unexpected and generous reading. Somewhat 
enigmatically, the MVR suggested that section 7 would play a special 
role in the criminal justice system without limiting the guarantee, in any 
conclusive way, to that purpose.50 Neither of the Court’s previous 
landmarks, in Singh and Operation Dismantle, intimated that section 7 
had special — much less exclusive — significance for the criminal 
justice system. In the circumstances, the Motor Vehicle Reference 
opened new frontiers which threw section 7 and Charter review more 
generally into a state of excited uncertainty. 
Justice Wilson wrote separately, and alone in the MVR. Rather than 
pose a frontal challenge to the majority opinion she wrote an aloof 
concurrence in which she proposed, most notably, that a breach of 
fundamental justice cannot be saved by section 1.51 In addition, she 
placed important asterisks beside Lamer J.’s conception of the guarantee. 
First, Wilson J. rejected the suggestion that section 7’s content should be 
                                                                                                             
48 Id., at 503 (claiming that s. 7’s principles of fundamental justice do not “lie in the realm 
of general public policy but in the inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of the justice 
system”). 
49 The distinction between “justice” and “policy” would provide meaningful content for 
s. 7, “all the while avoiding adjudication of policy matters”; id. 
50 As Lamer J. explained, “it is not necessary to decide whether the section gives any 
greater protection, such as deciding whether, absent a breach of the principles of fundamental 
justice, there can still be … a violation of one’s rights to life, liberty and security of the person”: id., 
at 500. He also indicated that because imprisonment unquestionably deprives a person of liberty, he 
would not attempt to give any further content to the entitlements protected by s. 7’s first clause. 
51 Id., at 523-24. Justice Wilson gave s. 7 an interpretation that created a hierarchy between 
its two clauses. In her view, a breach of the entitlements clause which did not violate fundamental 
justice could be saved by s. 1, but a limit which violates fundamental justice could not be considered 
a reasonable limit in any circumstances.  
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informed or determined by the legal rights set out in sections 8 to 14.52 
Second, she disagreed with Lamer J.’s view of fundamental justice as a 
“qualifier” on the entitlement clause’s guarantees of life, liberty and 
security of the person.53 In stating these points of difference Justice 
Wilson signalled that she was neither ready nor willing to approve a 
restrictive conception of this vital, “crucible” guarantee. 
Nor did she wait long to offer an alternative conception of section 7 
which rejected the parameters of the Motor Vehicle Reference. 
Dissenting alone, she stated in R. v. Jones that a definition which tied 
section 7’s conception of liberty to a guarantee against physical restraint 
was “too niggardly”.54 She ignored Lamer J.’s admonition in the MVR 
that the American due process jurisprudence was of no relevance55 and 
cited cases that gave “liberty” in the due process clause a broad 
substantive interpretation.56 Not only did she conclude that section 7 
protects a “parent’s right to educate his children in accordance with his 
conscientious beliefs”,57 she stated, in the broadest terms imaginable, that 
the entitlement includes “the freedom of the individual to develop and 
realize his potential to the full, to plan his own life to suit his own 
character, to make his own choices for good or ill, to be non-conformist, 
idiosyncratic, and even eccentric”.58 Rather than engage the question of 
                                                                                                             
52 As she explained, “I do not think that ss. 8 to 14 of the Charter shed much light on the 
interpretation of the phrase ‘in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice’ as used in 
section 7”; id., at 530. Equating s. 7 and the other legal rights was problematic under her 
interpretation: though a violation of s. 7’s principles of fundamental justice could not be saved by 
s. 1, infringements of the other legal rights were subject to s. 1. Section 7 was a stand-alone 
guarantee and it was preferable, in her view, to treat the other legal rights “as self-standing 
provisions, as indeed they are”; id.  
53 She disagreed with Lamer J.’s suggestion that the guarantee’s principles of fundamental 
justice act as a “qualifier” of the entitlements protected by the first clause; as she explained, “I do 
not view the latter part of the section as a qualification on the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person in the sense that it limits or modifies that right or defines its parameters.” To the contrary, 
she said, “[i]ts purpose seems to me to be the very opposite, namely to protect the right against 
deprivation or impairment unless such deprivation or impairment is effected in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice”. Id., at 523 (emphasis added). 
54 [1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, at 317 (S.C.C.). 
55 Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 40 (stating, in particular, that the 
substance/procedure distinction is “largely bound up in the American experience with substantive 
and procedural due process” and that to allow that debate to define the issue for the Charter would 
“do our own Constitution a disservice” and import into the Canadian context “American concepts, 
terminology and jurisprudence, all of which are inextricably linked to problems concerning the 
nature and legitimacy of adjudication under the U.S. Constitution”).  
56 R. v. Jones, supra, note 54, at 317 and 319-20. 
57 Id., at 320. 
58 Id., at 318. 
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interpretation, the rest of the Court acquiesced in her dissent without 
commenting one way or the other.59 
The Motor Vehicle Reference invited the constitutionalization of the 
criminal law without deterring litigants from testing the limits of section 
7 in other settings. And though she normally did not comment on the 
Court’s decisions, Wilson J. delivered a speech on section 7 which 
explained why she did not join the majority in the MVR. She did not 
accept Lamer J.’s theory of the relationship between section 7 and 
sections 8 to 14, and worried that by referring to the other legal rights as 
“examples of what was covered by s. 7” his approach might “restrict s. 7 
to the criminal law field”.60 In stating that she was anxious to avoid that 
result Wilson J. made it clear that she did not regard the MVR as 
determinative of the guarantee’s interpretation.61 
R. v. Morgentaler was the case that would alter the fate of section 7. 
Not only was abortion a politically divisive issue, recognizing a 
woman’s right to seek an abortion would take the Court well beyond the 
MVR’s definition of liberty as a constraint on physical freedom. Given 
those dynamics it is not surprising that the Court had difficulty with the 
claim. Plurality opinions by Dickson C.J.C. and Beetz J. dodged the 
most controversial issues by shifting attention to security of the person 
and reverting — ironically, following the Motor Vehicle Reference — to 
a procedural interpretation of the guarantee. Each found, as a result, that 
the manifest unfairness of the Criminal Code’s scheme violated the 
Charter. Meanwhile, and though it led them in opposite directions, 
Wilson J. and McIntyre J. both held that the scheme’s procedural defects 
were irrelevant unless the right to seek an abortion was constitutionally 
protected.62 Citing the negative example of American due process law, 
McIntyre J. wrote forcefully, in dissent, that “the courts must not, in the 
guise of interpretation, postulate rights and freedoms which do not have 
a firm and a reasonably identifiable base in the Charter.”63 He found that 
                                                                                                             
59 Justice La Forest’s majority opinion simply stated that it was unnecessary to determine 
whether liberty includes the right of parents to educate children as they see fit: id., at 302. 
60 “Constitutional Law — Section 7”, Wilson Speeches, supra, note 44, 449, at 454. 
61 Id. 
62 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 142 (S.C.C.) (per 
McIntyre J., stating that a woman’s security of the person cannot be infringed by state action unless 
she has a right to an abortion), and at 161-62 (per Wilson J., holding that the Court must tackle the 
primary issue first and determine whether a woman can be compelled to carry a foetus to term 
against her will, before considering any procedural unfairnesses in the scheme). 
63 Id., at 136. 
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“no right of abortion can be found in Canadian law, custom or tradition 
and that the Charter, including section 7, creates no further right”.64  
Justice Wilson’s concurrence stands in sharp relief against the 
backdrop of a guarantee which was intended to be procedural in nature 
and the daring but constrained substantive approach of the MVR, as well 
as the procedural focus of the plurality opinions and the McIntyre J. 
dissent. Not only did she disregard repeated warnings about the dangers of 
relying on American substantive due process doctrine and reprise her 
dissent in Jones, she went further and approvingly cited the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s abortion decision in Roe v. Wade.65 In addition, while other 
members of the Court steered clear of it, Wilson J. gravitated toward the 
liberty entitlement and positively embraced it.66 After decreeing that 
section 7 “guarantees to every individual a degree of personal autonomy 
over important decisions intimately affecting their private lives”, she 
instructed her male colleagues that “[i]t is probably impossible for a man 
to respond, even imaginatively” to the dilemma women face in dealing 
with an unwanted pregnancy.67 Not only is this dilemma “outside the 
realm of his personal experience”, she continued, a man can only relate to 
the decision to have an abortion “by objectifying it” and “thereby 
eliminating the subjective elements of the female psyche which are at the 
heart of the dilemma”.68 In conclusion she found that Parliament’s scheme 
violated principles of fundamental justice because it interfered with 
section 2(a) of the Charter, which guarantees freedom of conscience.  
By writing this time in concurrence, Justice Wilson gave her 
interpretation of section 7 a stronger foothold in the jurisprudence. Even 
though it was fundamentally at odds with the Motor Vehicle Reference, 
other members of the Court chose — in the circumstances of the 
abortion debate — neither to endorse nor reject her view of the 
guarantee.69 Yet she had been clear about not accepting limits on the 
                                                                                                             
64 Id., at 148. 
65 Id., at 167-71 (per Wilson J., discussing U.S. jurisprudence, including Roe v. Wade’s 
(410 U.S. 113 (1973)) trimester framework for the regulation of abortion). 
66 Id., at 163 (stating that to address security of the person without considering liberty of 
the person “begs the central issue in the case”). 
67 Id., at 171. 
68 Id. 
69 Justice McIntyre dissented in R. v. Morgentaler, id., and in other cases following the 
Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 40, such as R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 1, [1987] 2 
S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.). He did so, not because he had a preference between Justice Lamer and Justice 
Wilson’s interpretation of the guarantee, but to oppose any conception of s. 7 which involved 
judicial review of legislative policy.  
(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) JUSTICE IN HER OWN RIGHT 383 
entitlements — and liberty in particular — which would tie those 
guarantees to the criminal justice system. Significantly, the proposition 
that section 7 protects individual autonomy from fundamental 
interference from the state had the potential to engage the Court in 
review of social and economic policy. Moreover, by incorporating 
section 2(a) into section 7 to find a breach of fundamental justice in 
Morgentaler, Wilson J. rejected the MVR’s suggestion that the clause 
was limited to, or required, a connection with the justice system.70 
Some of Justice Wilson’s ideas about section 7 were plainly 
unworkable.71 Yet in challenging Lamer J.’s justice-based conception of 
the guarantee, she identified the MVR’s fatal flaw: the idea that section 7 
could have substantive content, so long as the guarantee was selectively 
limited to matters arising in the justice system. Though the Court might 
have rejected this conception of the guarantee in due course, Lamer J. 
wrote forceful opinions in this period which were aimed at preventing 
Wilson J.’s alternative from gaining acceptance. In the Solicitation 
Reference he aggressively defended his theory with a pre-emptive strike 
against any enlargement of section 7 beyond a strict construction of the 
Motor Vehicle Reference.72 In particular, he insisted that the liberty 
entitlement be limited to a guarantee of freedom from interference with 
physical liberty.73 Such a definition excluded social and economic 
entitlements — including the right to earn a living by prostitution — as 
well as Wilson J.’s freedom in matters of fundamentally personal 
decision-making. Justice Lamer claimed that any other approach would 
plunge the Court into an American style of review which would 
compromise the legitimacy of section 7 and of review under the Charter 
                                                                                                             
70 Specifically, she found that legislation which violates freedom of conscience cannot be 
in accordance with principles of fundamental justice and would be invalid for that reason, but would 
also be invalid under the majority’s approach, which would test violations of fundamental justice 
under s. 1 of the Charter. 
71 She struggled with the relationship between s. 7’s two clauses, as well as with the 
relationship between s. 7 and the Charter’s other provisions. She proposed a double standard within 
s. 7 itself — whereby breaches of the entitlements clause, but not the fundamental justice clause, 
could be saved by s. 1 — which did not make sense. Likewise, the suggestion that an infringement 
of another guarantee — such as s. 2(a) — would automatically infringe fundamental justice was also 
unworkable, and inconsistent with her view that infringements of ss. 8 to 14 could be saved by s. 1. 
Finally, the proposition that a violation of fundamental justice cannot be saved by s. 1 — a kind of 
s. 7 absolutism — may have backfired by making it very difficult to establish a breach of the 
guarantee.  
72 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Solicitation Reference”]. 
73 Id., at 1177. 
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more generally.74 His urgent, almost alarmist, concurrence in the 
Solicitation Reference contended that the only legitimate interpretation 
of section 7 was the one he had proposed in the MVR.75 
The Court responded to his plea, essentially, by ignoring it. The 
other judges may have been uncomfortable with both interpretations: 
while Lamer J.’s selective focus on physical liberty and the justice 
system was narrow and perhaps too constraining, Wilson J.’s was open 
and boldly indeterminate in its conception of entitlement.76 In any case it 
was unnecessary, for the time being, to decide between the two. A focus 
on criminal justice and the substantive criminal law during this period 
tended to reinforce the Motor Vehicle Reference’s conception of section 
7.77 Then, a few years after Justice Wilson retired, the Court was asked to 
choose in a case which pushed the guarantee outside the criminal justice 
system and a definition of entitlement based on freedom from physical 
restraint. The question in B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of 
Metropolitan Toronto was whether section 7 protects a parent’s right to 
make decisions about a child’s welfare, including the decision to refuse a 
blood transfusion, without interference from the state.78 Chief Justice 
Lamer valiantly defended the MVR’s theory of section 7 but wrote once 
again in isolation and, this time, in near futility.79 For a plurality, La 
Forest J. returned to the due process case law first spurned in the MVR, 
endorsed the Jones dissent and Morgentaler concurrence, and adopted a 
                                                                                                             
74 Id., at 1176. 
75 Justice Lamer was clearly concerned about a line of lower court cases discussing s. 7’s 
application to economic entitlements. See, e.g., Wilson v. British Columbia (Medical Services 
Commission), [1988] B.C.J. No. 1566, 30 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 (B.C.C.A.) (granting s. 7 a substantive 
interpretation outside the justice system which rejected “pure economic rights” but embraced the 
right to choose one’s occupation and where to pursue it, in the context of provisions restricting the 
right to practise medicine). 
76 See Robert Yalden, “Working with Bertha Wilson: Perspectives on Liberty, Judicial 
Decision-Making and a Judge’s Role” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 297 [hereinafter “‘Working with 
Bertha Wilson’”] (describing Justice Wilson’s deliberative process in this case and her decision not 
to address s. 7 and its application to social or economic entitlements). 
77 See generally J. Cameron, “From the MVR to Chaoulli v. Quebec: The Road Not Taken 
and the Future of Section 7” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (analyzing the evolution of s. 7 and its 
gradual shift from an exclusive focus on the criminal justice system). 
78 [1994] S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.). 
79 The most revealing parts of his opinion expose his fears about the consequences of 
departing from the Motor Vehicle Reference’s constraints on review. In particular, he claimed that a 
Wilsonian approach to s. 7 would confer constitutional protection on “all eccentricities expressed by 
members of our society” and inevitably lead to a situation where we would have government by 
judges”. Id., at 248. 
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Wilsonian definition of liberty.80 Despite or because the stakes were so 
high, the other members of the Court declined once more to choose 
between alternative conceptions of section 7. Even so, it would only take 
two more turns for a majority of the Court to adopt Justice Wilson’s 
conception of liberty.81  
Twenty years after the Morgentaler concurrence the jurisprudence 
supports an interpretation of section 7 that protects individuals from 
arbitrary action by the state which interferes with their liberty or security 
of the person — broadly understood — wherever and however it arises.82 
That said, lingering doubts about the legitimacy of a broad conception of 
section 7 have not been dispelled and the status of the guarantee remains 
as uncertain now as it was when the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference was 
decided. 
The section 7 jurisprudence might look quite different today, had 
Justice Wilson not written at all in Morgentaler but joined one of the 
plurality opinions, or had the Court upheld the legislation and 
transformed her opinion into a dissent. Justice Lamer advocated the 
MVR’s conception of section 7 vigorously, and for as long as he could; 
his approach has unquestionably been dominant in the jurisprudence and 
counts many supporters. In the circumstances it is difficult to imagine 
how section 7 would have evolved if Justice Wilson had not proposed an 
alternative to Justice Lamer’s approach. Though the Court might have 
adopted a similar definition of liberty at the initiative of another judge, 
the introduction of an entirely new interpretation — especially one as 
                                                                                                             
80 With L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and McLachlin JJ. concurring, he held that s. 7 
guaranteed parents the right to make certain decisions about their children’s health and welfare, and 
found more generally that “the individual must be left room for personal autonomy to live his or her 
own life and to make decisions that are of fundamental personal importance”: id., at 368. Justices 
Iacobucci and Major wrote separately, and Sopinka J. agreed with La Forest J.’s disposition of the 
appeal without commenting the latter’s interpretation of s. 7. 
81 See Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.) 
(holding, though only in a plurality opinion, that a residence requirement as a condition of 
employment violated s. 7’s liberty guarantee); and Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights 
Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307 (S.C.C.) (endorsing, by majority opinion, a 
definition of liberty under s. 7 that would protect inherently personal decision-making on issues of 
fundamental importance to the individual). 
82 See Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 
(S.C.C.) (dissenting opinion of Arbour J., adopting an openly substantive interpretation of s. 7 
which would include social and economic entitlements); and Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney 
General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) (plurality opinion of McLachlin C.J.C. 
and Major J., holding a provision in health care legislation unconstitutional under a substantive 
interpretation of s. 7).  
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far-reaching as hers — would be less likely over time.83 By creating 
space for a different approach, Justice Wilson’s Morgentaler concur-
rence — with an important assist from the Jones dissent — really made a 
difference in the evolution of the section 7 jurisprudence.  
Morgentaler was not the only concurrence of Justice Wilson’s that 
made a difference, but it is the opinion that earned her high praise and 
fierce criticism for presenting as a “feminist” judge. Her Charter legacy 
cannot be broached without addressing the most persistent myths about 
Bertha Wilson’s decision-making — that she was a biased and 
unapologetically feminist judge as well as an unremitting Charter activist.  
III. “BUT IT JUST ISN’T THAT SIMPLE”84 
Bertha Wilson was the Supreme Court’s first woman judge at the 
moment constitutional rights arrived, and the times were ripe for myth-
making about both historic events. By 1982 the women’s movement had 
attained strong momentum as a political force and as an agent for change 
to the law. With the Charter’s encouragement, activists turned to the 
courts for assistance in realizing the movement’s goals of equality and 
rights for women. It was not surprising that so many looked for 
leadership in their cause and a voice on the Court in its sole woman 
judge,85 or that efforts to establish entitlements for women and others 
encountered resistance, even backlash, in these years. No matter what 
she did, as the Court’s first and only woman judge, Justice Wilson would 
have been conspicuous.86 In the event, some of the polarization which 
                                                                                                             
83 But see Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), id. (per Arbour J., proposing a novel and 
radical interpretation of the guarantee, years after most assumed the authoritative status of the Motor 
Vehicle Reference, [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.)). 
84 Bertha Wilson, “The Making of a Constitution”, Public Lecture on the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms delivered at the University of Windsor Law School (April 1988), in Speeches 
Delivered by the Honourable Bertha Wilson [unpublished volume, available at the Supreme Court 
of Canada Library] 528, at 537. 
85 Bertha Wilson acknowledged being fretful about the expectations generated by her 
appointment. As she explained, she came to the realization that “no one could live up to the 
expectations” of the well-wishers who had written to congratulate her and to rejoice that, at last, a 
woman would sit on the Supreme Court of Canada. As well, Justice Wilson “had the sense of being 
doomed to failure, not because of any excess of humility … or any desire to shirk the responsibility 
of the office, but because [she] knew from hard experience that … [c]hange in the law comes slowly 
and incrementally. …”: Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” (1990) 28 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 507. 
86 Justice Wilson was joined at the Court by Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, who was appointed 
on April 15, 1987 (two days before the Charter’s fifth anniversary), and by Beverley McLachlin, 
who would later become the first woman to hold office as Chief Justice of Canada, on March 30, 
1989. Bertha Wilson retired on January 4, 1991. 
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formed in contests taking place outside the courts attached to her. She 
attained a reputation for being anything but moderate, for eagerly 
embracing feminist causes, and for compromising her neutrality as a 
judge. Her interventions were seen as a form of advocacy — and 
inappropriate advocacy, in some quarters — on her part. To this day 
perceptions of Justice Wilson focus on her relationship with feminism. 
Whether viewed as a good or a bad judge she has been regarded, 
invariably, as a feminist judge.  
The Morgentaler concurrence was her point of entry to feminist 
decision-making.87 There, as discussed above, she not only found that the 
Charter protects a woman’s right to an abortion, in doing so she 
pointedly — and confrontationally — also noted that men are incapable 
of understanding the dilemma women faced.88 Critics remarked that her 
reasons read “more like a feminist tract than an interpretation of law”89 
and stated that she might as well have stated that “men are too ignorant 
of women to ever understand something as personal as abortion”.90 Her 
reasons looked so much like a “straightforward feminist polemic”,91 one 
commentator maintained, that it was doubtful whether any radical 
feminist could have “put the case for free abortion more strongly than 
did Madam Justice Bertha Wilson”.92  
The strongest challenge to Justice Wilson’s integrity came from 
REAL Women, an organization which promotes equality for all women, 
including homemakers — by espousing a traditional conception of 
women’s role — and styles itself as “Canada’s Alternative Women’s 
Movement”.93 At a time of rapidly shifting ground on questions related 
to gender relations, REAL Women was not alone in attacking the 
feminism that was associated with Justice Wilson’s Supreme Court 
decision-making. Nonetheless, poised at all times to lambaste her as 
vocally as possible in the press, REAL Women was a constant irritant. 
Accordingly, President Gwen Landolt responded to Morgentaler with an 
“ad feminem”, which dismissed Wilson as a “prime example of 
                                                                                                             
87 Supra, note 62.  
88 See text accompanying notes 67 and 68, supra. 
89 Letter to the Editor, The Globe & Mail, February 15, 1988, at A6. 
90 Id. 
91 Letter to the Editor, The Lawyers Weekly, Vol. 17, No. 44 (April 3, 1998). 
92 William Johnson, Editorial Op-ed, “Abortion ruling could colour decisions on porn, Bill 
101”, Montreal Gazette, January 30, 1988, at B3. 
93 REAL is an acronym for Realistic, Equal, Active, for Life. 
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affirmative action” and as “nothing more than a voice for the feminist 
National Action Committee on the Status of Women”.94  
The Morgentaler concurrence in 1988 was followed by Justice 
Wilson’s landmark speech, delivered at Osgoode Hall Law School in 
1990, not long before she retired from the Court. Titled “Will Women 
Judges Really Make a Difference?”, the speech proved controversial 
because its central claim, which exposed the assumption of judicial 
impartiality to skepticism, was seen as a feminist manifesto.95 Not only 
did Justice Wilson question the law’s impartiality, she exposed key areas 
which — in her view — were deeply gendered, and then made 
suggestions for reform. REAL Women filed a complaint with the 
Canadian Judicial Council which called for her removal from office. The 
organization issued press releases which maintained that “those who do 
not support Madam Justice Wilson’s acceptance of the feminist 
interpretation of the law cannot enjoy the confidence in her impartiality 
but rather have been put at a grave disadvantage by her bias.”96  
Justice Wilson’s second “feminist” decision, R. v. Lavallee,97 
followed the “Making a Difference” speech by a matter of months. 
There, the Supreme Court allowed a woman to plead battered wife 
syndrome and claim self-defence after shooting her abusive, live-in 
partner. Though Wilson J. had persuaded her reluctant male colleagues 
at the Court to adopt a feminist interpretation of the defence, criticism of 
the decision was aimed at her.98 Those who thought that Lavallee had 
acted in anger or revenge were prompted to ask why “Judge Wilson 
think[s] that she has the right to impose her own feminist biases on the 
                                                                                                             
94 Quoted in David Vienneau, “Group attacks ‘childless’ judge on abortion ruling”, The 
Toronto Star, April 23, 1989, at A2. The mean-spirited temper of the times is revealed in Landolt’s 
suggestion that the same reasoning that prevented a man from understanding the decision to have an 
abortion applied to Bertha Wilson, who was childless. “How can she possibly understand anything 
about childbirth?” Landolt asked.  
95 Supra, note 85.  
96 Cited in “Justice and gender: REAL Women calls for the ouster of Supreme Court 
Justice Bertha Wilson”, Alberta Report, February 26, 1990, at 34. REAL Women first filed a 
complaint about Justice Wilson in 1983; both complaints were dismissed by the Canadian Judicial 
Council.  
97 [1990] S.C.J. No. 36, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (S.C.C.). 
98 Robert Sharpe and Kent Roach report that R. v. Lavallee, id., demonstrated Dickson J.’s 
“growing attachment to Wilson’s equality views and his receptivity to her feminist perspective, 
which re-examined traditional legal doctrines in light of their effect on women”: Robert Sharpe & 
Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), at 
406. 
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rest of us”.99 The ever-present REAL Women commented that “[a]ny 
attempt to blindly accept the feminist analysis of law and life and ignore 
others, is both demeaning and unjust — not only to all other Canadian 
women but to men as well.”100 To some, Wilson J. had simply included 
women’s perspectives and experiences in determining how the law of 
self-defence should apply in a context of domestic violence. To others, it 
looked like bias: a feminist agenda pushing special rules for women. 
When Justice Wilson retired at the end of 1990, she was described as 
“the much revered feminist icon who took the opportunity to use her 
considerable judicial power to push a radical feminist agenda”.101 That 
was before the woman who was also described as “a hero to feminist 
lawyers” produced a Canadian Bar Association Task Force Report on 
Gender Equality in the Profession.102 When it was released in 1994, the 
Touchstones Report was dismissed as “just another example of ‘feminist 
male-bashing’”, and was described variously as a “radical feminist 
rant”103 and as a “costly feminist harangue” which tabled “an 
unflinchingly feminist wishlist of recommendations”.104 Ms Landolt of 
REAL Women weighed in with the remark that the Canadian Bar 
Association had only voted unanimously to accept a motion on 
inequality because the profession was cowed by “fear of the venomous 
wrath of feminism”.105 
Bertha Wilson died several years later on April 28, 2007, following 
an illness — Alzheimer’s Disease — which rendered her inaccessible 
and unable, in recent years, to confirm, deny or discuss her relationship 
with feminism. Before falling ill she communicated through her 
                                                                                                             
99 Letter to the Editor, The Toronto Star, September 25, 1990. The author added: “Judge 
Wilson’s application of feminist theories to cases she hears, while on the bench, has undermined my 
confidence in the court.” 
100 Gwendolyn Landolt, “Feminism has no place in Supreme Court decisions”, Editorial 
Opinion, The Vancouver Sun, May 1, 1990. She added that “[t]o permit judges to involve 
themselves in a particular political philosophy by giving feminist theories priority in the court, can 
only undermine the integrity of the Court. No court can provide true justice when the views of only 
one special group are afforded full weight and the views of all others are dismissed or ignored.” Id. 
101 Claire Hoy, “Judges without review: Godlike court charts Canada’s future”, Editorial 
Opinion, The Province, February 12, 1991. 
102 David Vienneau, “Lawyers set to tackle controversial study”, The Toronto Star, February 
20, 1994. See Report of the Canadian Bar Association on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession: 
Touchstones for Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability (Ottawa: Canadian Bar 
Association, 1993). 
103 David Vienneau, “Lawyers, judges refuse to hold racism inquiry into their profession”, 
The Montreal Gazette, February 21, 1994. 
104 “Cowed by Bertha’s legal feminism”, British Columbia Report, March 14, 1994, at 33. 
105 Id. 
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biographer that she did not regard herself as a feminist.106 This revelation 
surprised and dismayed a generation of women scholars, lawyers and 
activists who had been inspired by her leadership.107 Many years earlier, 
when she was interviewed for the first time since being appointed to the 
Supreme Court, Wilson described herself as a “moderate feminist”.108 
Yet at that time she also expressed “little patience with feminists who 
demand that she use her position on the court to battle for women’s 
rights” and added that “[i]f I went around making speeches and 
displaying a bias it would make me totally useless as a judge.”109 
Justice Wilson’s death has generated fresh commentary about her 
relationship to feminism, and raised questions about who is a feminist 
judge and what role self-identification plays in the answer.110 Whether 
she was a feminist judge depends on how feminism is defined, what it 
means to be a feminist judge, and who — as between the supporters and 
detractors of feminism — is asking. Without engaging the scholarship on 
these issues, the discussion that follows offers a couple of examples 
from her jurisprudence to show that Justice Wilson cannot be easily 
typecast — whether as a feminist or as an activist judge, for that matter. 
Her approach to decision-making required her to decide each case 
independently and on its own merits. Sometimes, as in the case of 
abortion, it led her to support feminist causes, and other times it did 
                                                                                                             
106 It was astonishing to many that such a negative view of feminism would figure 
prominently in the biography of a woman who had been celebrated as a feminist judge. Most 
disturbing, perhaps, was the way Ellen Anderson presented Justice Wilson: as a judge who was 
above feminists and their aggressive pursuit of results. It was not simply that Justice Wilson rejected 
feminist outcomes or a feminist account of particular decisions. More fundamentally, the point was 
that Wilson was “avowedly not a feminist”, and “most emphatically does not consider herself to be a 
feminist”: Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001), at 134 and 135-36 (emphasis added). See also Preface, id., at xiv (stating that 
“confrontation has never been Wilson’s style and despite the labels attached to her judgments and to 
her scholarly writings by other commentators, she declines to identify herself as a feminist”). 
107 Constance Backhouse, for one, lamented that the woman who had contributed so much 
to the advancement of equality would not embrace feminism “with heart and soul”. If Ellen 
Anderson is indeed correct, and Justice Wilson is “avowedly not a feminist”, Backhouse added, 
“that is perhaps saddest of all”. “How misconceived the movement that has contributed so much to 
the advancement of equality must be if women such as Bertha Wilson seek to separate themselves 
from it”: Constance Backhouse, “Book Review of Anderson” (supra, note 106), in Labour/Le 
Travail, v. 51 (Spring 2003), at 295-97. 
108 Sandra Gwyn, “Sense and Sensibility”, Saturday Night, July 1985, at 19.  
109 Id. 
110 See, e.g., Constance Backhouse, “Justice Bertha Wilson and the Politics of Feminism” 
(2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 33, and Colleen Sheppard, “Feminist Pragmatism in the Work of Justice 
Bertha Wilson” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 83; see also Beverley Baines, “But Was She a Feminist 
Judge?” in Kimberley Brooks, ed., One Woman’s Difference: The Contributions of Justice Bertha 
Wilson [forthcoming, UBC Press]. 
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not.111 For instance, and though it is not usually included in a list of her 
significant contributions, Wilson J.’s concurring opinion in R. v. Bernard 
is significant because it led directly to one of the Court’s most vilified 
and least feminist Charter decisions.112 In R. v. Daviault Cory J. adopted 
Wilson J.’s flexible approach from Bernard and concluded that, at least 
in cases of extreme drunkenness, the defence of intoxication is 
constitutionally protected.113 The suggestion that the more intoxicated a 
person is, the greater the chance of an acquittal, deeply offended public 
sensibilities. The reaction was immediate and visceral.  
There was more at stake in Daviault than the commission of a 
simple assault. The facts involved a chronic alcoholic who committed a 
sexual assault on an older and disabled woman. Those circumstances 
brought conflict between the rights of victims and those of the accused 
to the forefront. Feminist voices across the country rose quickly and in 
unison to throttle the Court, condemn the decision, and demand 
Parliament’s intervention.114 The decision was such a debacle that the 
federal government took the then unprecedented step of overruling the 
Court’s decision by statutory amendment, without invoking section 33 of 
the Charter.115  
The majority judges in Daviault who had simply chosen a middle 
position between two extremes were blindsided by the criticism. Justice 
Sopinka’s dissent found that self-induced intoxication is blameworthy in 
and of itself, and was sufficient to ground a conviction, whether or not 
the accused was too intoxicated to know what he or she was doing at the 
time the offence was committed. As a matter of principle, Cory J. was 
unwilling to substitute the accused’s fault in becoming intoxicated for 
the mens rea to commit sexual assault. At the same time he was 
                                                                                                             
111 See the Pelech Trilogy: Pelech v. Pelech, [1987] S.C.J. No. 31, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801 
(S.C.C.); Richardson v. Richardson, [1987] S.C.J. No. 30, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 857 (S.C.C.); and Caron 
v. Caron, [1987] S.C.J. No. 32, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 892 (S.C.C.) (family law decisions which have been 
criticized by feminist scholars); see also Robert Leckey, “What Is Left of Pelech?” (2008) 41 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 103. 
112 [1988] S.C.J. No. 96, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833 (S.C.C.). 
113 [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.). 
114 See, e.g., David Vienneau, “Drinking ruled a rape defence; Feminists outraged at 
Supreme Court decision”, The Toronto Star, October 1, 1994, at A1 (reporting that the National 
Action Committee on the Status of Women had called the ruling “absurd”); Stephen Bindman, 
“Criminal law rewritten; Drunkenness defence endorsed by high court” (reporting that NAC had 
dismissed the decision as “totally, totally unacceptable”). 
115 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 33.1(1), as am. by An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (self-
induced intoxication), S.C. 1995, c. 32, s. 1. Parliament would do so a second time following the 
Court’s decision in R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 (S.C.C.). 
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unwilling to adopt a position which would allow the accused to plead the 
defence in all cases.116 He found the solution in a limited defence which 
would grant the plea, but only where the accused’s intoxication resulted 
in a state of mind akin to automatism.117 Even so, he imposed the burden 
on the accused to establish the defence on a balance of probabilities and 
stressed repeatedly, albeit in vain, that under his criteria intoxication 
would only succeed as an answer to a charge in the rarest of cases.118 
The Daviault doctrine was drawn straight from Bertha Wilson’s 
concurring opinion in R. v. Bernard.119 There, the Court fractured badly 
and failed to reach a majority position on the status of intoxication under 
section 7 of the Charter. Chief Justice Dickson argued gamely, but 
without success, that the law of intoxication had been altered by the 
Charter and that his Leary dissent should be adopted.120 In concluding, to 
the contrary, that the Charter does not require a defence of intoxication 
for general intent offences, McIntyre J. held that the mens rea element is 
satisfied — for crimes committed during a state of intoxication — by the 
accused’s voluntary act in becoming intoxicated.121  
With La Forest J. waffling on the mens rea issue — and agreeing 
with Dickson C.J.C. and McIntyre J. — the balance of power on the 
panel fell to Justice Wilson.122 The Dickson and McIntyre positions were 
both too uncompromising for her. On one hand her views on mens rea 
and the rights of the accused made it difficult for her to agree with 
McIntyre J. that the act of becoming intoxicated could supply the mental 
element for an entirely different act, committed in a state of intoxication. 
On the other, Dickson C.J.C.’s proposal that the defence of intoxication 
                                                                                                             
116 See R. v. Leary, [1978] S.C.J. No. 39, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 29 (S.C.C.) (dissenting opinion) 
and R. v. Bernard, supra, note 112 (dissenting opinion). 
117 As he explained, “it is only those who can demonstrate that they were in such an extreme 
degree of intoxication that they were in a state akin to automatism or insanity that they might expect 
to raise a reasonable doubt as to their intent to form the minimal mental element . … The phrase 
refers to a person so drunk he is an automaton.” Daviault, supra, note 113, at 99-100.  
118 Id., at 100 (stating that “[i]t is obvious that it will only be on rare occasions that evidence 
of such an extreme state of intoxication can be advanced and perhaps only on still rarer occasions is 
it likely to be successful”). 
119 Supra, note 112. 
120 In R. v. Leary, supra, note 116, Dickson J. wrote a forceful dissent which argued that the 
distinction between special and general intent offences be abandoned and that intoxication be 
available as a defence to a charge. Justice Lamer joined his dissent in R. v. Bernard, supra, note 
112, which argued that the Court was required, by virtue of ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, to reverse 
its pre-Charter Leary decision.  
121 Justice Beetz concurred in McIntyre J.’s opinion in R. v. Bernard, id. 
122 Justice La Forest agreed in principle with Dickson C.J.C. but found, in the result, that 
Bernard could be convicted under the no-miscarriage-of-justice rule. 
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be generally available was unacceptable. Justice Wilson wrote a 
resourceful concurring opinion which found a middle position between 
the two in the concept of intoxication akin to automatism. Under her 
solution the defence would only be allowed when the accused was too 
drunk to form the minimal intent necessary to commit a general intent 
defence, and would require “evidence of extreme intoxication involving 
an absence of awareness akin to a state of insanity or automatism”.123 
Though she upheld the conviction, her Bernard concurrence really 
mattered because it created an exception to the harshness of the Leary 
rule.124 In adopting that exception, Daviault created a new defence for a 
man who had consumed copious amounts of brandy and sexually 
assaulted an elderly and disabled woman. 
The legal rights guarantees were heavily litigated in the early years 
of the Charter, and Justice Wilson keenly supported the rights of the 
accused in developing the substantive law as well as in addressing 
questions of procedural entitlement.125 Though there were other 
distinctions, the key difference between Bernard and Daviault was that 
the Charter rights of victims came into focus in the interim between the 
two, and dramatically changed the dynamics of adjudication.126 Even so, 
it is probable that her concurrences in Bernard and Penno would have 
led Justice Wilson to the same conclusion as Cory J. in Daviault.127 It is 
the kind of decision she might have wanted to write, but for her to do so 
would surely have disappointed — if not betrayed — her feminist 
supporters.128  
Some of the Court’s most contentious decisions in the 1990s 
revolved around sexual assault, and the contest between the privacy and 
                                                                                                             
123 R. v. Bernard, id., at 887. 
124 Justice Wilson otherwise reserved the question whether McIntyre J.’s concept of a 
substituted mens rea would be unconstitutional under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter; id., at 889. 
125 See generally Benjamin Berger, “A Due Measure of Fear in Criminal Judgment” (2008) 
41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 161, and Kent Roach, “Justice Bertha Wilson: A Classically Liberal Judge” (2008) 
41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 193. 
126 Though Bernard was convicted, Daviault was not; also, Wilson J. noted the sexual 
assault in R. v. Bernard, supra, note 112 but the facts in R. v. Daviault, supra, note 113 were 
egregious and received extensive publicity. 
127 In R. v. Penno, [1990] S.C.J. No. 96, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 865 (S.C.C.), Wilson J. confirmed 
her view that denying an accused access to a defence of intoxication would violate the Charter, but 
only in cases of extreme intoxication.  
128 There were no intervenors in R. v. Daviault, supra, note 113 and the case did not appear 
to raise feminist issues until after the decision was released; the Court’s two women judges, 
L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ. — perhaps on the strength of the flexible Wilson approach and 
by virtue of L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s concurrences in Bernard, supra, note 112, and Penno, id. — both 
concurred in Cory J.’s majority opinion. 
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equality rights of complainants and the legal rights of the accused which 
emerged in that setting. Decisions which vindicated the rights of the 
accused provoked strong reactions from feminist quarters in this 
period.129 Though Justice Wilson retired before being called upon to 
choose, her strong commitment to the Charter’s legal rights — including 
and especially full answer and defence — makes it uncertain that she 
would have favoured the feminist position in cases like R. v. Seaboyer,130 
R. v. Osolin,131 or R. v. O’Connor.132 Justice Wilson was an individualist, 
a non-conformist and a free thinker. She was not deterred, as a judge, 
from standing firm on a point of principle, even when doing so isolated 
her from other members of the Court and provoked controversy. She 
became iconic, in large part because she fearlessly and willingly stood 
alone. Rather than meet feminist expectations she would have applied 
her own principles to determine how the tension between the rights of 
the accused and those of complainants should be resolved.  
Bertha Wilson may have been less of a feminist than her admirers 
would like her to be or than her harshest critics claimed that she was. 
She may also have been more of a feminist than she and her biographer 
cared to admit — a reluctant feminist, an occasional feminist or a 
moderate feminist as she said in 1985, but a feminist in certain ways and 
on certain issues just the same. At all times she aspired to a methodology 
of principled decision-making and often rehearsed a favourite anecdote 
to illustrate the point. She recounted the story of an intern who asked the 
brain surgeon how he could perform an arduous operation so calmly, 
skillfully and heartlessly. The surgeon replied, “[y]oung man years ago I 
learned to lose my sympathy as an emotion — and to gain it as a 
principle”.133 And that, in short, was how Justice Wilson saw herself as a 
judge. She did not like to be called a feminist or an activist because these 
labels called her judicial integrity into question, and she was quick to 
defend the Court from criticism for its so-called activism. She pointed 
out that “we didn’t volunteer”, that Canada’s democratic institutions had 
imposed the Charter on the courts, and that the judges had a duty to 
                                                                                                             
129 See, e.g., R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.), and R. v. 
O’Connor, supra, note 115.  
130 Id. 
131 [1993] S.C.J. No. 135, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595 (S.C.C.). 
132 Supra, note 115. 
133 See, e.g., “Remarks Made at the University of Western Ontario Convocation upon 
Acceptance of an Honorary Degree (June 8, 1984), in Speeches Delivered by the Honourable Bertha 
Wilson [unpublished volume available at the Supreme Court of Canada Library] 184, at 186. 
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exercise the powers that had been granted.134 She also thought that 
principled decision-making — and a sound methodology of 
interpretation — were important checks on activism. 
From that vantage, the section 2(d) jurisprudence sheds light on the 
nature of her activism under the Charter. There, Justice Wilson eagerly 
enforced freedom of association in all the cases she heard, but one.135 She 
wrote and voted in favour of union interests in every case that came 
before the Court, joining Dickson C.J.C.’s dissent in the Alberta 
Reference and then refusing to dilute the Oakes test in Retail, Wholesale 
and Department Store Union v. Saskatchewan and the PSAC case.136 Her 
solo dissents in the latter two cases are consistent with her reputation as 
an Oakes test stickler in most section 1 cases.137  
In R. v. Skinner she also held that the Charter protects the right to 
negotiate an act of prostitution.138 Her dissent in this case maintained that 
when two individuals associate to arrange a transaction or activity, the 
associational act must be separated from the underlying activity and 
given near-absolute protection under the Charter.139 The fact that the 
purpose of soliciting is to negotiate a sexual transaction was irrelevant, 
in her view, because “[o]nly the coming together is protected.”140 She 
thought that Dickson C.J.C. erred in rejecting the challenge to the 
Criminal Code’s solicitation provision because he focused on the 
“proposed sexual activity” rather than “the association of the parties to 
discuss the possibility of providing or obtaining a sexual service”.141 Nor 
was she hesitant, in the companion case to Skinner, to grant 
                                                                                                             
134 See “We Didn’t Volunteer” (April 1999) Policy Options 8 (claiming that judges did not 
seize powers under the Charter, but simply exercised powers that were given to them by the people). 
135 She found in favour of the s. 2(d) claimant in the following cases: Reference re Public 
Service Employee Relations Act (Alta), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Alberta Reference”] (joining Dickson C.J.C.’s dissent); Public Service Assn. of 
Canada v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.) (writing in solo dissent); and 
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v. Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 
S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.) (writing in solo dissent) (together known as the Labour Trilogy); R. v. Skinner, 
[1990] S.C.J. No. 51, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235 (S.C.C.) (dissenting opinion); and Professional Institute 
of the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] S.C.J. No. 75, 
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 367 (S.C.C.) (joining Cory J.’s dissent). The exception is Lavigne v. Ontario Public 
Service Employees Union, [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.) (concurring opinion). 
136 Id. 
137 See Adam M. Dodek, “The Dutiful Conscript: An Originalist View of Justice Wilson’s 
Conception of Charter Rights and Their Limits” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 331. 
138 [1990] S.C.J. No. 51, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235 (S.C.C.). 
139 Id. 
140 Id., at 1249. 
141 Id., at 1248 (emphasis added). 
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constitutional protection to economic claims under section 2(b); as she 
explained, these choices are protected, “whether the citizen is 
negotiating for the purchase of a Van Gogh or a sexual encounter”.142 
Together, the two dissents show how unwilling she was to place internal 
limits on the Charter’s rights.  
She also persisted in the effort to secure Charter status for labour 
union activities in Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada 
v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner).143 Though the Court could not 
agree on a definition of associational freedom in the Labour Trilogy, a 
majority concluded that section 2(d) does not protect collective 
bargaining or the right to strike. The next time the issue came up, 
Dickson C.J.C. and Wilson J. were the only Trilogy judges who 
remained on the Court. The Chief Justice wrote an apologetic concurring 
opinion in Professional Institute which explained that he considered 
himself bound by the Trilogy and had no choice but to reject the claim.144 
Meanwhile, Wilson J. took a different view of the Trilogy’s authority 
and joined Cory J.’s dissent, which insisted that those cases left the 
constitutional status of collective bargaining open.145 It is significant that 
once again — and with perfect consistency — Wilson J. chose a position 
which gave freedom of association maximum scope under the Charter.  
Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union146 is the outlier 
in her section 2(d) jurisprudence. There, and for the first time, she found 
against the claim in a case that asked whether the guarantee includes a 
right of non-association. In two of its most significant early decisions, 
the Court had emphasized freedom from coercion of the state in its 
discussion of section 2, and concluded that Sunday closing laws violated 
the religion guarantee because they violated the right to be free from 
compulsory observance.147 In Lavigne, Wilson J. wrote a concurring 
                                                                                                             
142 Solicitation Reference, [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at 1206 (in reference 
to s. 2(b)’s guarantee of expressive freedom). 
143 Supra, note 135. 
144 Id., at 374 (stating that he did not reach his decision “without considerable hesitation” 
but “reluctantly” could not agree with Cory J. because, “short of overruling the reasons of the 
majority of the Court in the trilogy” the claim would have to be denied). 
145 The claim was that McIntyre J.’s comments in PSAC, supra, note 135, left the question 
open. There, he stated that his conclusion that s. 2(d) does not include the right to strike did not 
preclude “the possibility that other aspects of collective bargaining may receive Charter protection”. 
146 Supra, note 135. 
147 See R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.) and R. v. 
Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.) (in which Wilson J. 
dissented, in part, from the majority opinion finding a breach but upholding Ontario’s Sunday 
closing legislation under s. 1). 
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opinion which absolutely rejected the proposition that section 2(d) 
protects individuals from compelled association by the state. In doing so 
she broke her record of support for associational freedom and departed 
from her practice of reading Charter entitlements generously.  
The Rand formula requires workers who do not belong to unions to 
pay dues where the union serves as the employee’s representative on 
collective bargaining and workplace issues. The question in Lavigne was 
whether the state can compel non-union members to pay dues which 
support causes outside the workplace that they find politically, socially, 
ideologically or culturally objectionable. By a four-to-three vote, the 
Court held that mandatory dues for non-workplace matters do not violate 
section 2(d).148 Justice Wilson forcefully argued that non-association is 
the opposite of association and that to recognize a freedom from 
association would imperil and defeat section 2(d)’s collective 
aspirations.  
Her hostility to the claim — which she perceived as a threat to unions 
— is palpable in the reasons. After relying on the Alberta Reference to 
support an individualistic conception of associational freedom in Skinner, 
she argued in Lavigne that all members of the Court in the Alberta 
Reference had agreed with the Chief Justice’s view, in dissent, that section 
2(d) is meant to protect the “collective pursuit of common goals”.149 
Moreover, though it was inconsistent with her previous views, including 
her refusal to be bound by the Labour Trilogy in Professional Institute, 
she cited the majority opinion in Skinner — which had rejected the claim 
over her dissent — to support a restrictive view of the guarantee in 
Lavigne. In contrast to her position under section 7, where she had ignored 
Lamer J.’s warning and embraced controversial substantive due process 
doctrine, she rejected first amendment doctrine in Lavigne because “the 
Court must exercise caution in adopting any decision … of a foreign 
jurisdiction”.150 Justice Wilson also claimed that to recognize non-
association would place the Court “in the impossible position of having to 
                                                                                                             
148 Supra, note 135. Justice Wilson wrote for herself, as well as L’Heureux-Dubé and Cory 
JJ., in concluding that s. 2(d) does not include a right of non-association; McLachlin J. wrote 
separate reasons which concluded that s. 2(d) includes a negative entitlement but that compelling 
non-union members to support non-workplace causes did not violate the guarantee. The other 
members of the Court, led by La Forest J., found that mandatory dues for non-workplace objects 
violated s. 2(d) but were justifiable under s. 1. 
149 Lavigne, supra, note 135, at 252; see also at 258 (relying again on the majority opinion 
in R. v. Skinner, supra, note 135 to support a restrictive view of the entitlement in the compelled 
association context) (emphasis added). 
150 Id., at 257. 
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choose whose rights should prevail” and would make “a mockery of the 
right contained in section 2(d)”.151 But never before had she supported 
limits of this kind on the scope of the entitlement. Never before had she 
telegraphed such overt resistance to the nature and content of the claim. In 
Skinner she had emphasized, to the contrary, that the bare act of 
associating must be divorced from any disapproval of the activity or 
purpose of the association. Lavigne was a decision of utmost importance 
to her; there she worked hard to explain why non-association should not 
be recognized, and denied the existence of the claim absolutely, and in all 
circumstances.152  
One measure of activism is a judge’s willingness to enforce rights 
against the state, and in that regard Justice Wilson led the “activist wing” 
in the Court’s first 100 Charter decisions.153 Yet she rejected the claim in 
some important cases, including Lavigne.154 From that perspective, she 
may not have been as activist as some have claimed but, at the same 
time, she was more activist than she was willing to admit. Her reasons in 
Lavigne were convoluted, formalistic and, to be frank, transparently 
result-oriented; there, she advanced her subjective preferences at the 
expense of principle, and that is also a form of activism.155 That said, she 
would not have seen it that way, and might have responded, “it just isn’t 
that simple.”156 The Labour Trilogy was such a disappointment to her 
                                                                                                             
151 Id., at 260. 
152 In R. v. Bernard, [1988] S.C.J. No. 96, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833 (S.C.C.), for example, she 
supported a middle position that was controversial in R. v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, [1994] 3 
S.C.R. 63 (S.C.C.),  for balancing the scales too far in the accused’s direction. 
153 F. Morton, Peter Russell & Michael Withey, “The Supreme Court’s First One Hundred 
Charter of Rights Decisions: A Statistical Analysis” (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, at 44. Though 
the rest of the Court, in combination, supported the Charter claim 35 per cent of the time, Wilson 
J.’s numbers, at 53 per cent, were significantly higher. Justice Lamer, who had the next highest rate, 
supported the claim 47 per cent of the time, and Dickson C.J.C. — who is remembered for his 
leadership of the Court in the early Charter years — supported the claim at a much lower rate of 37 
per cent. Id., at 40 (see Table 13).  
154 See, e.g., Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
927 (S.C.C.) (upholding a limit on children’s advertising); R. v. Turpin, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 
1 S.C.R. 1296 (S.C.C.) (rejecting an equality challenge in the context of an election for trial by 
judge and jury); and R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.) (upholding 
the Criminal Code’s hate propaganda provision). 
155 Rather than reject non-association in unequivocal terms, she could have found that 
s. 2(d) did not protect freedom from non-association in these circumstances, as McLachlin J. did, or 
justified the infringement under s. 1, as La Forest J. did. 
156 Bertha Wilson, “The Making of a Constitution”, Public Lecture on the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms delivered at the University of Windsor Law School (April 1988), in Speeches 
Delivered by the Honourable Bertha Wilson [unpublished volume, available at the Supreme Court 
of Canada Library] 528, at 537. 
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that it not only set up her other section 2(d) decisions but prompted her 
most influential opinion, in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta, and her most 
innovative idea — the contextual approach. The methodology she 
proposed quickly became, and remains today, the definitive approach to 
Charter interpretation. Though she did not have the opportunity to 
develop it before retiring, Justice Wilson forged a link in her extra-
judicial writings between the contextual approach and an aspirational 
conception of the Charter. Specifically, the concept of context allowed 
Wilson — and those who followed in her path — to draw distinctions 
between valid claims and others, such as Lavigne’s, which would 
trivialize or undercut the Charter’s broader purposes. 
IV. THE MANDATE AND THE METHODOLOGY 
Justice Wilson explained her approach to the challenge of Charter 
interpretation this way: “[w]e have the mandate”, she declared, and 
“[n]ow we have to develop the methodology for carrying it out.”157 Her 
attention to methodological questions made a critical difference in at 
least two concurrences: one was Morgentaler, as discussed above, and 
the other was Edmonton Journal.158 In each instance she wrote 
separately, and each time she proposed an approach that would 
subsequently be adopted by a majority of the Court. Her definition of 
liberty in Morgentaler freed section 7 from the shackles of an 
interpretation which might have confined the guarantee to the criminal 
justice system. In Edmonton Journal she proposed a methodology which 
she dubbed “the contextual approach”. What initially took the form of a 
counterweight to what Justice Wilson regarded as an unacceptably 
abstract approach to the definition of Charter rights soon became an 
article of faith, and then the dogma of Charter interpretation.  
Justice Wilson agreed with Cory J.’s conclusion that the legislative 
provision unjustifiably limited section 2(b), but wrote separately in 
Edmonton Journal to address a key point of Charter methodology.159 She 
juxtaposed two approaches to Charter interpretation — the abstract and 
                                                                                                             
157 The David B. Goodman Memorial Lectures, Delivered at the University of Toronto 
(November 26-27, 1985), Wilson Speeches, id., 394, at 418. 
158 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.); Edmonton Journal 
v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 (S.C.C.).  
159 For an insider’s account of Justice Wilson’s decision to introduce the contextual approach 
in this case, see Robert Yalden, “Working with Bertha Wilson” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 297.  
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the contextual — and explained why it was backward for the Court to 
privilege the abstract at the expense of the contextual. It is clear from her 
reasons — as well as her extra-judicial remarks — that she spoke out in 
Edmonton Journal because she profoundly disagreed with the Court’s 
decision in the Alberta Reference.160 Rather than consider whether “the 
special kind of associational activities forming the subject of the 
dispute” were constitutionally protected, the majority in that case had 
enlarged the question and asked whether section 2(d) protects 
associational activity of all descriptions — generally, at large, and in the 
abstract.161 Under that approach, once golf and curling were not 
protected, it followed that union activities like collective bargaining and 
the right to strike were also excluded from the Charter.162  
Justice Wilson intervened in Edmonton Journal to explain why that 
approach was misguided. She observed that a right or freedom may have 
a “different value depending on the context”163 and suggested, as a result, 
that the “importance of the right or freedom must be assessed in context 
rather than in the abstract”.164 Only in this way would the right or 
freedom be given “a generous interpretation aimed at fulfilling that 
purpose and securing for the individual the full benefit of the 
guarantee”.165 She said that a “combined purposive and contextual 
approach” would “be more sensitive to the reality of the dilemma posed 
by the particular facts” than abstract thinking.166 In her view, this 
methodology would also make it more conducive “to finding a fair and 
just compromise between the two competing values under section 1”.167  
Justice Wilson wrote in Edmonton Journal to show how an abstract 
conception of entitlement could defeat the objective of giving Charter 
rights a generous and purposive interpretation, and to discourage the 
Court from drawing on abstract generalizations to decide the merits of 
                                                                                                             
160 Edmonton Journal, supra, note 158, at 1354-55; see also “The Making of a Constitution: 
Approaches to Judicial Interpretation”, University of Edinburgh (May 1988), in Speeches Delivered 
by the Honourable Bertha Wilson [unpublished volume, available at the Supreme Court of Canada 
Library] 550, at 564-67 (stating, pointedly, that “the Chief Justice’s approach [in the Alberta 
Reference] may be contrasted with that of the majority”, which “applied neither a contextual nor a 
purposive approach”; id., at 566). 
161  Edmonton Journal, id., at 1355. 
162 Id. 
163 Id., at 1355. 
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particular cases. Once having made that point she said little else in 
Edmonton Journal about what the contextual approach meant, or how 
she thought it might apply in other cases or to other questions of Charter 
interpretation. While its contours remained unexplored, the contextual 
approach hit a responsive chord with members of the Court who were 
struggling, at the time, with the relationship between abstract concepts 
and concrete decision-making. The abstract and demanding structure of 
the Oakes test, in combination with an abstract definition of the 
Charter’s rights and freedoms, left little room for the weighing of facts 
and balancing of competing interests. First and foremost, Justice 
Wilson’s contextual approach provided the opportunity — and a 
rationale — for the Court to retreat from the rigours of R. v. Oakes.168  
The contextual approach shifted almost immediately from its origins 
in a comment on abstract conceptions of entitlement to a doctrinal 
mainstay in the section 1 analysis of section 2(b) claims.169 There, it took 
the form of a supplement to the Oakes test which enabled the Court to 
dilute the standard of justification in cases where the expressive activity 
was deemed to be valueless, of low value or distant from the core of 
section 2(b)’s ideals.170 Instead of providing a means for securing the full 
benefit of the guarantee, the contextual approach played the role of the 
spoiler. As such, it provided a solution to abstract thinking which was 
seen as problematic because it granted too much, rather than too little, 
Charter protection. The court’s assumption that all expression — 
including and especially objectionable expression — is prima facie 
protected by the Charter would prove especially difficult.171  
By creating a device that facilitated evaluation of the content of 
expression and downward adjustments to Oakes, the contextual approach 
                                                                                                             
168 [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
169 See Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] S.C.J. No. 65, [1990] 
2 S.C.R. 232 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rocket v. Royal College”] (adopting the contextual approach in 
the context of commercial expression and invalidating restrictions on professional advertising). 
170 The contextual approach was applied, with negative consequences for s. 2(b), in R. v. 
Keegstra, supra, note 154; R. v. Butler, [1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Zundel, [1992] S.C.J. No. 70, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.) (dissenting opinion); Hill v. Church of 
Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (S.C.C.); RJR-MacDonald Inc. 
v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“RJR-MacDonald”] (dissenting opinion); Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 
S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Lucas, [1998] S.C.J. No. 28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 
439 (S.C.C.). For a critique on the contextual approach in s. 2(b) cases, see J. Cameron, “The Past, 
Present, and Future of Expressive Freedom under the Charter” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 
[hereinafter “‘The Past, Present and Future of Expressive Freedom’”]. 
171 Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General), supra, note 154 (granting the guarantee a broad 
interpretation). 
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enabled the Court to avoid the consequences of Irwin Toy’s principle of 
content neutrality.172 This version of the contextual approach was 
dominant in the section 2(b) jurisprudence and resulted in almost every 
limit on objectionable expression being upheld during the 1990s.173 
Though the doctrine has since been modified, it continues to provide a 
rationale for deferential section 1 review in section 2(b) cases.174  
The contextual approach has also had a dampening effect on the 
scope of entitlement under section 15 of the Charter. There, the Court 
was only able to agree on a definition of equality after much difficulty. 
Under its standard for breach in Law v. Canada, the concept of context 
provides the framework for a structured and complex — but flexible — 
series of doctrinal obstacles that claimants must overcome to establish a 
prima facie breach of equality.175 The test is so onerous that few claims 
in recent years have proceeded from section 15 to section 1.176  
The paradox of the contextual approach is this: Justice Wilson’s 
Edmonton Journal concurrence had its origins in a complaint that 
abstract thinking caused the Court to exclude labour union activities 
from the Charter. In that setting her preferred methodology would have 
expanded the scope of entitlement under section 2(d) and led the Court 
to a different conclusion. Yet following Edmonton Journal, the con-
textual approach became a device for constraining constitutional rights, 
both on the initial question of entitlement — as in the case of section 15 
— as well as on the issue of justification, as occurred in the section 2(b) 
jurisprudence.  
                                                                                                             
172 In this setting the contextual approach allowed the Court to measure expressive activity 
against s. 2(b)’s core values and to relax the standard of review under s. 1 in cases where the content 
of the expression wandered from those values.  
173 But see Rocket v. Royal College, supra, note 169, R. v. Zundel and RJR-MacDonald, 
supra, note 170. In Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
569 (S.C.C.), the Court invalidated a provision that essentially placed a complete ban on third party 
advertising but indicated that third party limits were reasonable in principle. 
174 See Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, 
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.) (applying a modified version of the contextual approach and 
invalidating an opinion poll blackout); Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] S.C.J. No. 58, 
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 764 (S.C.C.) (upholding limits on third party spending); and Bryan v. Canada 
(Attorney General), [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) (upholding a legislative 
provision which prohibits election results from being divulged). 
175 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 
1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.).  
176 There is a considerable commentary on the Law test and its implications for s. 1. See, 
e.g., Christopher Bredt & Adam Dodek, “Breaking the Law’s Grip on Equality: A New Paradigm 
for Section 15” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 33; and Bruce Ryder, Cidalia C. Faria & Emily Lawrence, 
“What’s Law Good For? An Empirical Overview of Charter Equality Rights Decisions” (2004) 24 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 103. 
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The contextual approach may have evolved in unexpected directions, 
in part, because it was unclear exactly what Justice Wilson meant by it. 
In certain ways it was a gift that enabled the Court to avoid the 
consequences of abstract and open-ended definitions of entitlement, 
coupled with an abstract and strict standard of justification under section 
1. By juxtaposing the competing values at stake and bringing the 
balancing exercise into the open, this approach allowed the Court to 
choose between values in ways that were either obscured or prohibited 
by the value-neutral standards of formal equality, the Court’s definition 
of expressive freedom, or Oakes. The unanswered question is whether 
Justice Wilson would have endorsed the rights-constraining conse-
quences of her approach. Though she resisted internal limits on the 
Charter’s rights and freedoms, there were exceptions to that principle, in 
R. v. Turpin as well as in Lavigne.177 In general, she also refused to dilute 
the Oakes test, though there are exceptions to that principle as well.178 It 
is revealing that Justice Wilson had been reflecting on the role of context 
in Charter interpretation for some time before proposing it as a distinct 
methodology in Edmonton Journal. Though she did not explain it in 
such terms, for her, context was the key to the “true test” of rights.  
At the outset of the Charter, Justice Wilson viewed constitutional 
rights as an invisible fence which set boundaries on the state’s authority 
to interfere with individual freedom. This conception is found in her 
Jones and Morgentaler opinions, in the Skinner and Solicitation 
Reference dissents, in her advocacy of strict review in “singular 
antagonist” settings, and more generally in her approach to section 1 and 
the application of Oakes.179 An alternative conception, which was more 
aspirational in nature, began to appear in her thought. The true test, she 
stated in various ways and on various occasions, was “how well [rights] 
                                                                                                             
177 But see also R. v. Turpin, supra, note 154 (repeating that each right, including s. 15, must 
be given its full independent content divorced from any of s. 1’s justificatory criteria and stating, at 
the same time, that the equality guarantee’s internal limitation that the differential treatment be 
“without discrimination” is determinative on the question of breach). R. v. Lavigne, [1991] S.C.J. 
No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.). 
178 Compare Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General), supra, note 154, and R. v. Keegstra, 
supra, note 170 (applying a lower standard of review to uphold limits on expressive freedom) and 
McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 (S.C.C.) (retaining a 
stricter form of scrutiny under s. 1 in this and the Court’s companion decisions on mandatory 
retirement). 
179 R. v. Jones, [1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morgentaler, 
[1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.); R. v. Skinner, [1990] S.C.J. No. 51, [1990] 1 
S.C.R. 1235 (S.C.C.); Solicitation Reference, [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.); 
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 102 (S.C.C.). 
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serve the less privileged and least popular segments of society” and 
“how well [a] particular rendering on a right will work to make society 
better, more tolerant and more civilized”.180 Those questions, in her view, 
could only be answered through an approach which “demands the 
continuing re-assessment of the scope of the right in light of changing 
circumstances and in light of contemporary social theory”.181 As she 
would explain, that inquiry is inescapably contextual.182 In other words, 
it was never as simple as asking how much liberty a person should have 
under section 7, or how much expressive freedom under section 2(b), 
because “[w]e are not concerned with the definition of these concepts in 
the abstract” but “with what they mean and how they apply in the 
context of real life situations presented to us by the litigants”.183 From 
this perspective, the contextual approach was not a device for watering 
down constitutional rights; rather, it offered a methodology which would 
promote a conception of the Charter as an instrument for the 
amelioration of those who are disadvantaged or powerless in Canadian 
society. That conception placed an important qualification on an abstract 
or formal view of the Charter as a fence, or border, against the state. 
Her Edmonton Journal concurrence was an initiative which 
introduced the contextual approach without fully exploring the deeper 
meaning it held for her. Though she had only just begun to explain her 
concept of context, Justice Wilson’s methodology set the standard for 
Charter interpretation, and today it infuses the jurisprudence across the 
full spectrum of issues. A critical examination of its underlying 
assumptions and its influence on the Charter’s development is beyond 
the scope of this article. 184 In concluding, it should be noted that Wilson 
                                                                                                             
180 “The Making of a Constitution”, Address to the Ninth Annual Conference of the 
National Association of Women Judges (October 1987), Wilson Speeches, supra, note 156, 512, at 
524. 
181 “The Making of a Constitution”, Public Lecture on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
delivered at Windsor Law School (April 1988), Wilson Speeches, supra, note 156, 528, at 540. 
182 Hawkins and Martin also claim that it is inescapably subjective: Hawkins & Martin, 
“Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson” (1995) 41 McGill L.J. 1, at 41 (stating that “[i]n the 
Wilsonian sense, context frees the judge to further his or her personal political agenda by making 
the meaning of words infinitely flexible”). 
183 Supra, note 181, at 537. 
184 The contextual approach and its role in Charter jurisprudence has not yet been fully 
probed, but is generally praised rather than criticized; see generally Ruth Colker, “Section 1, 
Contextuality, and the Anti-Disadvantage Principle” (1992) 42 U.T.L.J. 77; Shalin M. Sugunasiri, 
“Contextualism: The Supreme Court’s New Standard of Judicial Analysis and Accountability” 
(1999) 22 Dalhousie L.J. 126; and Timothy Macklem, “Making the Justification Fit the Breach” 
(2000) 11 S.C.L.R. (2d) 575. For a different view, see J. Cameron, “The Past, Present and Future of 
Expressive Freedom”, supra, note 170; and Hawkins & Martin, “Judging, Democracy and Bertha 
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J.’s approach was strongly endorsed by the Court in B.C. Health 
Services.185 There, the Court vindicated Wilson J.’s dissenting votes and 
opinions in the section 2(d) labour cases by overruling the Labour 
Trilogy and Professional Institute.186 Not only that, B.C. Health Services 
explicitly vindicated her critique of the Court’s abstract methodology in 
those cases, declared that the “decontextualized approach” to defining 
associational freedom stood “in contrast to the purposive approach taken 
to other Charter guarantees”, and found that it should not be followed.187 
In addition to concluding that collective bargaining is protected by 
section 2(d) in at least some circumstances, the Court validated Wilson 
J.’s Charter methodology.188  
The contextual approach evolved in directions Bertha Wilson might 
neither have foreseen nor fully approved, but has had an enormous 
impact on Charter interpretation. Of that there can be no doubt and it is, 
as a result, a central feature, if not the defining contribution, of her 
Charter legacy.  
V. JUSTICE WILSON’S LEDGER 
Bertha Wilson spoke many times at convocation ceremonies and 
when she did, she invited graduates to address three questions during the 
course of their professional careers. “What is the chief end we serve?” 
was the first, and “what new vision have we to offer our sons and 
daughters?” the second. Her third and final question asked, “what will 
we write at the top of our ledgers?”189 
A ledger of Justice Wilson’s milestone achievements, including her 
most important Charter decisions, could be drawn up without too much 
                                                                                                             
Wilson, supra, note 182, at 49 (stating that textual and abstract approaches make objective judging 
possible and arguing that by “substituting a contextual approach, which makes the outcome of the 
case entirely dependent upon what a given judge thinks is just and fair … Justice Wilson created an 
entirely subjective theory of interpretation”). 
185 Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.). 
186 Id., at 419 (concluding that the holdings in those cases “can no longer stand”). 
187 Id., at 417. 
188 The right to engage in collective bargaining is a limited right which is governed by a 
two-step inquiry: see id., at 441-45. See also J. Cameron, “Due Process, Collective Bargaining, and 
s. 2(d) of the Charter: A Comment on B.C. Health Services” (2006-2007) 13 C.L.E.L.J. 323 
(discussing, among other things, the Court’s application of the contextual approach). 
189 See, e.g., “Remarks Made at the University of Calgary Convocation” (November 18, 
1983), in Speeches Delivered by the Honourable Bertha Wilson [unpublished volume, available at 
the Supreme Court of Canada Library] 150, at 154. 
406 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
difficulty at this stage. But there would be problems with that exercise. 
One is that the purpose of a ledger is to tally credits and debits in order to 
determine a net position. Yet an explicit goal of this article has been to 
avoid the credit and debit thinking that has characterized much of the 
discussion of Justice Wilson’s legacy. A second, and related, difficulty is 
that this article never undertook to evaluate her Charter jurisprudence. She 
believed that the judges have a duty to enforce the Charter and that they 
should not be deterred by institutional constraints from discharging that 
duty. If it was a fearless view of the Charter, it was one that unavoidably 
provokes questions about the legitimacy of review. It is possible to admire 
Justice Wilson’s approach to decision-making without supporting or 
endorsing the substance of her interpretations.  
There is another way to consider her ledger. This article has shown 
that Bertha Wilson lengthened the shadow of the institution — the 
Court, the law, the Charter — in many ways, but especially in being able 
to “act singly”. Where others might have bowed to the pressures and 
demands of collegiality — or public opinion — she believed strongly 
that Charter interpretation required all the determination, energy and 
courage she could bring to bear on it. Some may have found her 
insistence on writing separate reasons to express a different perspective 
annoying, needless, obstinate or contrarian.190 But whatever one may 
think of her Charter jurisprudence, she did not flinch in the face of the 
awesome responsibility she took so seriously. Justice Wilson thought 
deeply about the meaning of rights and was the most faithful of judicial 
stewards in discharging her duty of review. By challenging herself in all 
tasks of Charter interpretation she encouraged those around her — her 
colleagues, the legal community and the broader community of 
Canadians — to stand up for their principles as she did for hers.  
In his “Essay on Self-Reliance” Ralph Waldo Emerson idealized 
those who act singly, claiming that “what you have already done singly 
will justify you now.”191 He also pronounced on greatness, declaring that 
“all history resolves itself very easily into the biography of a few stout 
                                                                                                             
190 See Cristin Schmitz, “Former chief justice Lamer reflects on his brightest, darkest 
moments as Canada’s top jurist”, The Lawyers Weekly, March 29, 2002 (disputing Justice Wilson’s 
account of collegiality within the Court and commenting, specifically, that there was no clique or 
“gang” that excluded her; that like-minded people tended to congregate and that there was little 
point including Justice Wilson, who was not going to change her mind; and that if she felt isolated it 
was not because the other judges did anything to isolate her). 
191 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Self Reliance”, in Emerson’s Essays (Washington: National 
Home Library Foundation, 1932) 27, at 35. 
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and earnest persons,”192 and stating that “[g]reatness always appeals to 
the future.”193 This article makes no claim either that Bertha Wilson was 
or was not a great judge, but it regards her with admiration as a “stout 
and earnest” pioneer of Charter interpretation. She was a woman who — 
to recall the words of Edward Everett Hale — would not let what she 
could not do interfere with what she could do, and would not refuse to 
do something she could do.194 Bertha Wilson will be remembered as the 
Supreme Court’s first woman judge, as a feminist, and as a champion of 
the Charter. She is remembered here because she was one woman, and if 
she never forgot that she was only one woman — and almost always the 
sole woman — she did not allow it to defeat her aspirations. That is why 
this article writes “justice in her own right” at the top of Bertha Wilson’s 
ledger.195 
 
                                                                                                             
192 Id., at 36. 
193 Id., at 35. 
194 This is a variation on the quotation Bertha Wilson cited herself. See note 5. 
195 “Justice in Her Own Right” was the title Benjamin Berger suggested for this book; I 
thank him for the suggestion and for allowing me to use it for my article. 
